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1. Introduction 
 
A well-known Dutch political reporter, Twan Huys, recently appeared in a Dutch current 
affairs program De Wereld Draait Door and talked about the high level of negativity in 
American election campaigns. He closed the topic by stating that Dutch politicians and 
political parties take over this negative form of campaigning (Huys in DWDD, broadcast 
23/03/2012).  
Negative campaigning, the form of election campaigning in which a candidate or 
party does not present their own position or policy but criticizes the position, policy or 
person of the other candidate(s) or party/parties as a strategy to win votes (Haynes & 
Rhine, 1998; Geer, 2006: 4,5; Lau, Sigelman & Rovner, 2007), is one of the most widely 
debated campaign strategies and has received increasing attention of the press, the public 
and scientists. In political science research much attention is given to the causes and the 
effects of negative campaigning (e.g., Jamieson, 1992; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; 
Kahn & Kenney, 2004; Lau & Pomper, 2004; Geer, 2006; Buell & Sigelman, 2008; Lau 
& Rovner, 2009). This widely given attention to the subject is probably due to the 
conventional perception that negative campaigning has been on the rise over the last 
decades. Journalists, politicians, and the public claim that there is an increase in the 
amount of negativity in election campaigns. However, existing empirical studies on the 
level of negativity in American campaigns are not in agreement with each other. Some 
researchers claim that the use of negativity in campaigns in the USA has increased over 
time (e.g., Pfau & Kenski, 1990; West, 1993; Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Benoit, 1999; 
Geer, 2006) while others find fluctuation over time (e.g., Kaid & Johnston, 1990; Kaid, 
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1997) or relative stability (e.g., Lau & Pomper, 2004). Besides this contradiction in 
existing research, the research on negative campaigning is very USA-dominated. There is 
little empirical investigation of the claim that election campaigns are becoming more 
negative in tone over the last decades, as is often assumed, outside the USA (Elemund-
Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson, 2011; Van Heerde-Hudson, 2011). The scarce amount 
of research that has been done outside the USA is not in agreement with the conventional 
perception that negativity is on the rise. Studies on the level of negative campaigning in 
England (Van Heerde-Hudson, 2011), Sweden (Håkansson, 1999; Esaiasson & 
Håkansson, 2002; Bjerling, 2007, cited in Elemund-Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson, 
2011) and Denmark (Elemund-Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson, 2011) agree that the 
level of negativity in election campaigns is not on the rise. There seems to be a 
disconnection between actual beliefs in society and empirical evidence in political 
science research. It makes one wonder whether negative campaigning is actually on the 
rise as an international trend or whether it is just an American phenomenon. Goodman 
(1996, cited in Sigelman & Shiraev, 2002: 45) states: ‘‘Negative campaigning is as 
American as Mississippi Mud’’. This may very well be true. 
The Netherlands is an interesting case for studying whether the presumption that 
negativity is on the rise outside the USA, is true. The Netherlands has a complex 
environment with a multiparty system in which a large number of very diverse parties 
compete for office and in which the government is usually a coalition. Due to this, 
negativity is very unlikely to occur on a high level in the Netherlands (Walter 2009, 
Walter & de Vries, 2011, Walter, 2011). If one can detect an increasing trend of 
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negativity in Dutch election campaigns this may very well also be the case for campaigns 
in other democracies in Western Europe.  
Negative campaigning in the Netherlands has not been studied extensively. 
Walter (2009) is the only one who studied the level of negativity in Dutch election 
campaigns. In her research she claims to have found a trend of an increasing level of 
negativity in Dutch election campaigns. Her conclusion, however, is too firmly stated 
considering that she based it on the analysis of just three of the most recent election 
campaigns. A longitudinal study is necessary to detect whether there is a trend of a rising 
level of negativity in election campaigns in the Netherlands.  
Besides to solve the contradiction and to fill the gap in existing scientific research, 
clarity is also needed because the rise of negative campaigning is very often associated 
with bringing negative consequences for the democratic functioning. Negative 
campaigning has received quite a lot of media attention (Skaperdas & Grofman, 1995) 
and political commentators often describe negative campaigning in pessimistic terms 
(Hansen & Tue Pedersen, 2008). The public and democratic observers have many 
complains and concerns about negative campaigning, because it is assumed to have 
devastating effects on the general political debate and on democracy itself. Also in 
scientific research negative campaigning has been claimed to have negative effects on the 
democratic process. Negative campaigning would lower voter turnout in elections, 
increase the public’s political cynicism and decrease the public’s feeling of political 
efficacy (e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Thorson et al., 2000). Even though 
scientific research shows that negative campaigning might have negative effects, there is 
little empirical evidence to confirm the presumed increase in negativity (van Heerde-
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Hudson, 2011). Why all this concern when there is no clear evidence that the level of 
negativity in election campaigns is really on the rise outside the USA?  
This study gives clarity on whether there is a rise in the amount of negativity used 
in campaigns in the Netherlands and whether the alarming concerns raised by journalists, 
the public and scientists need to be taken seriously. To answer these questions a content 
analysis of the coverage of statements made by politicians or political parties in 
campaigns for Dutch parliamentary elections from 1971 till 2010 by the Dutch newspaper 
with the highest circulation, De Telegraaf, has been done.  
In the first part of this thesis the concept of negativity is further explained and two 
opposing claims about the trend of the level of negativity in Dutch election campaigns are 
presented. The second part is dedicated to the focus of negative campaigns and the third 
section addresses possible consequences of negative campaigning for the democratic 
process. Finally the research methods, data collection, case selection, operationalization 
and measurements are discussed and results are presented.   
 
 
2. Definition   
 
Negative election campaigning is often seen as an undesirable way of campaigning. 
Some researchers use the term negative campaigning to denote a form of campaigning in 
which parties and politicians use dishonesties such as lying, falsely informing the public, 
and/or cheating to denigrate the opponent or opponents. This concept is mainly used by 
critics of negative campaigning and may better be referred to as illegitimate campaigning 
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(Jamieson, 1992: 19, 220). Negative campaigning as conceptualized in this study does 
not incorporate dishonesties. Negative campaigning is conceptualized here as the manner 
of campaigning where a party or politician does not bring forward or praises his or her 
own statements, positions, policies, values or character traits, and does not talk about him 
or herself as a strategy to become the voters’ most preferred party (this, in fact is positive 
campaigning), but talks about the opponent party or parties or the opponent candidate or 
candidates as a strategy to win votes (Lau & Pomper, 2004: 73). Referring to opponent 
group(s) of parties or politicians, like the left, the right, socialists, conservatives etc., or 
referring to the incumbent(s), the coalition or opposition is also conceptualized as 
negative campaigning. Negative campaigning however, also incorporates a negative 
element. Thus, whenever a party or politician talks about another party or another 
politician instead of talking about him-/herself or his/her party in campaigns, in order for 
the campaign to be conceptualized as negative, this is done using a negative tone (Haynes 
& Rhine, 1998; Djupe & Peterson, 2002; Geer, 2006: 4, 5). Negative campaigning is a 
strategy for political parties and politicians to distinguish themselves from other political 
parties or politicians by going on the offensive against their opponent(s) or by criticizing 
their opponent(s) (Lau, Sigelman & Rovner, 2007). By attacking another party, or parties, 
or politician(s), the attacker tries to persuade the voter not to vote for the attacked party, 
politician, incumbent, or group of parties. The attack can be either on (personal) character 
traits or on policy issues or values (Skaperdas & Grofman, 1995).  
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3. The level of negative campaigning: stability or change?  
 
As stated before, many people presume that the level of negativity used in election 
campaigns is on the rise. The first research question in this thesis discusses whether or 
not the presumed increase in negative campaigning in the Netherlands can be 
scientifically supported.  
 
Research Question 1: Is there a rise in the level of negativity in Dutch election 
campaigns?  
 
There are two arguments concerning the level of the negative form of campaigning in the 
Netherlands which will be explained in the next two sections. The arguments lead to two 
opposing hypotheses; one states that the level of negativity in campaigns in the 
Netherlands has increased over time (H1) and the other states that the level of negativity 
in campaigns in the Netherlands has not increased over time (H2).  
 
 
3.1 Negativity on the rise 
 
In the Netherlands, two campaign related developments have taken place over time that 
suggest that the level of negativity used in election campaigns has increased over time.  
Firstly, election campaigns in most Western democracies have been going 
through, and some would state are still going through, a process of Americanization (e.g., 
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Butler & Ranney, 1992: 278; Swanson & Mancini, 1996 4-6, 268; Scammell, 1998). 
Political parties are increasingly adapting their election campaigns to the American-style 
of campaigning (Swanson & Mancini, 1996: 268). American campaigns are known for 
their negativity. Especially in the USA negative campaigning is seen as an effective 
strategy to become a voter’s most preferred party (Lau & Pomper, 2004: 2). Parties in 
other countries take over this negative element in their campaigns. In the Netherlands, 
campaigns have also been transformed to a more American style (Brants & van Praag, 
2006). 
The Americanization of Dutch election campaigns provides the perfect 
circumstances for the level of negativity in campaigns to rise (van Holsteyn & Walter, 
2009). Americanization is visible in various aspects of the Dutch election campaigns. 
Firstly, before the process of Americanization, different controversies were addressed in 
a Dutch party’s election campaign. Parties tried to persuade voters to vote for them by 
putting forward their positions on various issues. Following the example of American 
campaigns, the focus of the political battle in Dutch election campaigns is now 
concentrated mainly on one controversy (van Holsteyn & Walter, 2009). A party puts one 
issue central in its campaign and uses that issue and its position on that issue to 
distinguish itself from other parties. When a party owns an issue that is on the general 
campaign agenda, that party will address that issue in a negative tone, thereby referring to 
the weaknesses of the opponent(s) on that issue. However when an issue that the party 
does not ‘own’ is on the agenda, the party will mostly campaign positively on that issue 
(Damore, 2002). Parties choose an issue over which they are seen more credible to attack 
others because it increases the benefits of an attack. Over time, parties build up 
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reputations to handle a specific issue well and are therefore already seen as more credible 
than other parties on that issue (Damore, 2002). Focussing on an issue ‘owned’ by a party 
gives that party a great opportunity to completely focus on the weaknesses of the 
opponent(s) on that issue. The strategy of going negative is used more often when 
election campaigns of parties are built around one issue (Damore, 2002).   
Secondly, in the Americanization process money and resources have become 
more important for the effectiveness of campaigns. The Dutch election campaigns have 
become more expensive (van Holsteyn & Walter, 2009). Part of the increase in 
expenditure is because parties, following American example, to a greater extent hire 
communication advisors and other consultants to organize their campaigns (Van Holsteyn 
& Walter, 2009). Campaigns have therefore become more professional (Scammell, 1998). 
Because more money is spent on campaigns and campaigns are becoming more 
professional, parties use the strategy of negative campaigning more often and on a larger 
scale. Although not exclusively supported in scientific research, the conventional wisdom 
about negative political campaigning holds that it works (Lau, Sigelman & Rovner, 2007). 
Negative campaigning is seen as an effective means of winning votes. Election 
campaigns in the Netherlands used to be centrally organized and only performed during 
election time (van Praag & Brants, 2008). In the new professional form of campaigning, 
following American example, campaigns are organized centrally and are conducted 
permanently (van Praag & Brants, 2008). Instead of just being used sporadically during 
times of elections and on a local smaller level, negative campaigning, since it is presumed 
to work, has become part of the central and permanent campaign strategy.  
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A final aspect of the process of Americanization visible in the Dutch election 
campaigns is the increase in focus on individual persons (Scammell, 1998). Individuals 
are the central focus of campaigns and campaigns are built around a person instead of 
parties. This trend is known as the process of personalization. An increasing amount of 
attention in campaigns is spent on persons at the expense of attention given to content 
and policy (Karvoren, 2007). Negative attacks are performed more on persons than on 
parties (Hansen & Tue Pedersen, 2008). Negativity is also said to be more effective when 
applied on persons instead of on parties (Hansen & Tue Pedersen, 2008). Although 
parties in the Netherlands, instead of candidates, are still the main focus in campaigns 
(Walter & Vliegenthart, 2010) and parties and politicians are still strongly connected in 
the Netherlands (van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2008) there is a detectable trend of 
personalization (Fiers & Krouwel, 2005). This, although slight, trend of personalization 
in the Netherlands makes the use of negativity more easy and effective and negative 
campaigning is therefore used more by political parties as a strategy to win votes. A 
rising level of negativity can be seen as part of the process of Americanization and the 
associated professionalization and personalization of Dutch election campaigns.  
During the latter half of previous century, politics have become mediazed 
(Swanson & Mancini, 1996: 81, 88, 89, 272). Mediatization is the second campaign 
related development that took place in the Netherlands that suggest that the level of 
negativity used in election campaigns has increased over time. Mediatization is the 
process in which political parties lost their autonomy and, for their communication with 
the public, became dependent of the news values of the mass media (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 
1999). This process affects the way politics itself and political communication especially 
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is structured (Swanson & Mancini, 1996: 88, 89). It has taken place in many European 
countries, including the Netherlands, incrementally from the second world war onwards 
(Elemund-Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson, 2011).  
At first parties became more dependent on the media for their communication 
with the public because the ties between parties and their followers and organizations in 
society like labour unions and the church became weaker (Elemund-Præstekær & 
Mølgaard Svensson, 2011). Parties first communicated with the help of these 
organizations directly with their followers. When their ties became weaker, the media 
became the most important way of communicating with the mass public. Parties also lost 
their fixed set of followers, and in their campaign wanted to address a wide range of 
people and needed the media to do so. As a consequence, the media became the most 
important source of campaign communication for parties (van Praag & Brants, 2008). 
At the same time, the media became more independent on politics (Elemund-
Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson, 2011). The media first were guided by political 
preconceptions, but now they are driven mostly by professional norms like news values. 
The media have stopped feeling responsible for the public interest but try to do best in a 
fragmented and competitive media market (van Praag & Brants, 2008). The media try to 
sell their products to the public and respond to the demands of the public. The media 
demand contestation from the parties because political consensus is not interesting for 
journalists to cover, for it is not what their audience or readers want to see, hear or read 
about. The conflict criteria became one of the most important news value criteria for the 
media to determine what to give attention.  
 15 
Since the 1990’s political parties have started to internalize this new media logic 
(RMO, 2004: 19, 20). Political parties know that they need the media to communicate 
with the mass public and therefore adapt to the demands of the media (Elemund-
Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson, 2011). They shape their campaign messages to meet 
the media’s standards of newsworthiness. Parties use negativity in their campaigns to 
meet the most important news value criteria of the media; the conflict criteria. Party 
strategists are aware of the fact that the media value negativity very highly and are more 
likely to report negative campaign messages (Tue Pedersen, 2011).  Parties go negative to 
gain media attention, especially because Dutch political parties have limited opportunities 
to use direct communication channels. Going negative is seen by political parties as an 
effective way of reaching voters.  
In the fifties television made its appearance. The influence of the television was 
limited at first, because only a few people could afford a television set. A few years later, 
however, the television became the most important source of communication for political 
parties (van Praag & Brants, 2008). Television, instead of the newspaper, became the 
central medium (Vos-Arwert, 2007). Negative campaigning is said to work better on 
television and is therefore used more within the medium of the television (Hansen & Tue 
Pedersen, 2008). 
Given the processes of Americanization and mediatization of Dutch politics with 
which negativity in campaigns is claimed to be associated, the first hypothesis regarding 
the level of negativity in campaigns is derived:  
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 Hypothesis 1: The level of negativity in election campaigns in the Netherlands has 
increased over time. 
 
 
3.2 Stability of the level of negative campaigning  
 
Not everybody agrees with the argument which suggests a rising trend in the level of 
negativity. The political and institutional structure and the party system of a country are 
of influence on historical campaign characteristics (van Praag & Brants, 2008). There are 
several characteristics of the Dutch political system that discourage the use of negativity 
in campaigns. These characteristics have not changed over time, making it seem illogical 
that the amount of negativity used in campaigns has changed. 
Firstly, in a multiparty system the benefits for a party to go negative are blurred. 
The goal of using negativity in campaigns is to increase the own party’s support (Haynes 
& Rhine, 1998). In a two-party system, the party which attacks the opposing party is also 
the one that gains the votes that the attacked party might lose. Because just two parties 
run in the election, every vote that the opponent loses is beneficial for the other party. 
Even when a voter who had intended to vote for the attacked party chooses to abstain 
from voting because he or she does not support the attacked party or candidate anymore 
nor the attacker, the attacker benefits. Every voter not voting on the opponent party is 
increasing the support for the own party. In a multiparty system, however, the benefits of 
attacking another party or candidate are blurred (Hansen & Tue Pedersen, 2008). 
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Although a party pushes away voters from one of the opponent parties by explaining why 
a voter should not vote for the opponent party -negative campaigning- it is not certain 
that those voters will vote for the attacker. Voters might just as well decide to give their 
vote to one of the many other parties in a multiparty system, like the Netherlands. In a 
multiparty system, when a party attacks an opposing party, the voters lost by the attacked 
party are not automatically going to vote for the attacker. There are many other options. 
Campaign strategists will not choose to campaign negatively that much because the 
benefit of a successful attack -increasing a party’s own support (Haynes & Rhine, 1998)- 
is not guaranteed (Hansen & Tue Pedersen, 2008).  
Secondly, in a multiparty system like the Netherlands, although the benefit of an 
attack for a party is not certain, the risk of going negative is in fact present. When 
attacking an opponent there is always the risk of it backfiring (Garramone, 1984). In a 
two-party system and a multiparty system there is a chance that voters perceive an attack 
as being some sort of last resort of a party that is in desperate need to win votes and goes 
far, maybe even too far, to gain them. In their reaction voters will not vote for the party 
that goes negative. In a two-party system, voters will not easily change their vote because 
parties represent very opposing views. In the Netherlands, the many political parties are 
relatively close to each other on ideological dimensions. Very often, another party is 
close to a voter’s preferred party. Because there are many parties and because parties are 
relatively close to each other, voters will easily vote for another party when their 
preferred party does something they do not like, such as going negative (Kleinnijenhuis 
& Fan, 1999). Party strategists keep this high risk of going negative in mind when 
campaigning and will not use much negativity for that reason.  
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Thirdly, in a multiparty system like the Netherlands, parties often divide 
themselves alongside multiple dimensions. This makes it less clear which party is the 
direct opponent of whom. An attack is hard to point at a specific opponent and it is 
therefore less clear and effective for parties to go negative (Hansen & Tue Pedersen, 
2008). It is also difficult to point criticism at the incumbent, something that happens often 
in the USA, because a coalition of multiple parties governs the Netherlands. When a 
party expresses criticism of a current policy, it is not clear for the public and the attacker 
which of the governing parties is responsible for that policy. It is hard for parties to attack 
a specific opponent and therefore it is more beneficial for them to distinguish themselves 
in a positive manner (Walter & Vliegenthart, 2010).  
Fourthly, a coalition of different parties forms the government in the Netherlands. 
Parties will have to be able to get along with each other after the elections because they 
might have to govern with each other. Parties want to keep all possible options for 
forming a coalition open (Hansen & Tue Pedersen, 2008). Dutch parties will not often 
attack each other because it might reduce their chances to become part of the next 
coalition. Winning parties will also need the support of other parties if they want to take 
part in government and want to accomplish anything in government. Unlike the 
American two-party system, the proportional system in the Netherlands expects a 
majority to govern and make policies. A party will not use the negative strategy very 
often since the party needs to remain close to other parties and not push them away. This 
could be compared to the primary elections in the USA. Generally there is a lower level 
of negativity in the primary elections than in the general elections because the candidate 
that wins the primaries also needs the support of the other candidate and the votes of the 
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voters which voted for the other candidate, in the general election. Therefore the 
candidate will not be eager to attack his or her opponent too much in the primaries 
(Peterson & Djupe, 2005). Parties in primaries and in multiparty systems tend to look at 
the long term effects of going negative, not just at the actual amount of votes, and 
conclude that it is more beneficial to keep the campaigning positive or at least not too 
negative.  
Finally, the use of negativity in election campaigns is also discouraged because of 
the long-standing political culture of mutual respect and consensus in the Netherlands 
(van Praag, 2005, see also Walter, 2009). Debates are known to be decent and a 
confrontational tone is not used often. Attacking an opponent, especially on character 
traits, does not fit in the consensus seeking political culture of the Netherlands and will 
therefore not be beneficial for a party.  
All these conditions which discourage the use of negativity in campaigns are still 
present in the Dutch political system. Therefore it does not seem plausible that the level 
of negativity has changed dramatically over time.  
Negative campaigning can also be seen as a timeless campaign strategy 
(Druckman, Kifer & Parker , 2010). Although negative campaigning appears to be a new 
phenomenon on the rise, however throughout history negativity is in literature also seen 
as a core mode of argumentation (Elemund-Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson, 2011). 
Historically, campaigns have always consisted of parties or candidates promoting their 
own points and criticizing the other ones points (Mark, 2006: 11). Aristotle, one of the 
most influential philosophers, stated that negative campaigning is as old as democracy 
itself (Elemund-Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson, 2011). His colleague Cicero also saw 
 20 
negative campaigning as an accepted campaign technique (Klotz, 1998). According to 
Cicero, parties have used negative campaigning when positive campaigning was not 
effective throughout history.  
Although negative campaigning is not a new phenomenon, it has just recently 
started to receive attention from both the public and scientists (Klotz, 1998). There are 
examples of negativity in Dutch election campaigns in more recent history. For instance, 
in the parliamentary election campaign of 1972 the overall level of negativity was known 
to be relatively high (Elzinga & Voerman, 2002). And the Dutch election campaign of 
1977 was also known as a relatively negative campaign (Walter, 2009). It seems as 
though the quantity of negativity in campaigns has remained the same, but it has become 
more obvious in the last decades (Elving, 1996). Negative campaigning has always been 
used in the Dutch society, although on a small scale, and did not increase over time as is 
often assumed.    
When looking at the proportional multiparty system of the Netherlands, its 
political culture of mutual respect and consensus and the assumption that negative 
campaigning is a strategy that was used all throughout history, the second, and competing, 
hypothesis can be derived.  
 
 Hypothesis 2: The level of negativity in election campaigns in the Netherlands has 
not increased over time.  
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4. The focus of negativity  
 
The level of negativity in election campaigns is not the only thing that could have 
changed over time. Researchers studying negative campaigning make a distinction 
between negative campaigning focusing on a candidate’s personality or a party’s 
character traits, negative campaigning focusing on broad themes or values, and negative 
campaigning focusing on policy position(s) or issue(s) (e.g., Walter, 2009; Walter & 
Vliegenthart, 2010; van Heerde-Hudson, 2011).  
Issue-based negative campaigning contains criticism directed at an opponent or 
opponents about their specific policies such as increasing taxes, returning refugees, etc. 
The negativity pertains to content and is seen by the public as, although negative, still 
contributing to the political debate and its quality (Geer, 2006: 42). Negative 
campaigning focusing on issues, albeit without checking whether the substantive 
statements are true, informs people. Value based campaigning is seen by the public as 
also contributing to the debasement of the political argument (Geer, 2006: 42). When 
political parties or politicians criticize their opponent based on values such as hope or 
change they are campaigning negatively focused on value. Even though the campaign 
addresses broad themes, it is still informative and therefore, in the eyes of the public, 
contributes to a good debate. However, negative campaigning based on character traits of 
a party or politician, such as intelligence, skills, credibility, consistency, clearness, 
courage, honesty etc. is seen by the public as not contributing to the political debate 
(Geer, 2006: 64). Negative attacks focusing on personality and character traits instead of 
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on content such as values or issues are seen as irrelevant for the public learning (Geer, 
2006: 64).  
According to popular belief, there has been an increase in the importance of 
personality and character traits in negative campaigning over the last few decades (Geer, 
2006: 70). Negative attacks tend to be personal (Jamieson, 1992: 45) and the public 
frown upon personal attacks. Geer (2006: 63-65) hypothesizes that instead of an increase 
in the amount of negativity used in campaigns, the negativity’s focus has shifted more 
towards character traits and personality. This shift has made campaigns seem more 
negative because attacks on personal traits are seen as more illegitimate than attacks on 
issues (Geer, 2006: 63-65). The focus on traits would decrease the attention given to 
content, and voters should be well informed about a party’s policies statements and 
values to make a good, solid, deliberated vote (Geer, 2006: 63-65). An increased focus on 
traits in negative attacks makes election campaigns less substantial.  
The hypothesis that negativity increasingly focuses on traits however does not 
have much support in existing literature. Geer (2006: 68) as well as Benoit (1999: 286), 
Klotz (1998), and Van Heerde-Hudson (2011) conclude that there is in fact no actual rise 
in the amount of personal attacks, but that the attacks are -still- more centered around 
issues. By showing that more real issues have been covered in negative attacks over time, 
Geer (2006) claims that negative campaigning has therefore been advancing the public 
debate.  
This research studies whether there is a rise in the total amount of campaign 
negativity over time. To understand this potential rise, it also seems necessary to assess 
whether there has been a change in the focus of negative campaigning. If attacks on 
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personal character traits have increased over time, it might explain why the public’s 
actual belief states that negativity is on the rise but most scientific research outside the 
USA claims it is not. The alarming concerns that presume that a rising level of negativity 
has negative effects on the democratic process may be nuanced should the focus of 
negativity lay more on content (issue and value). When studying the level of negativity, it 
matters what the focus of that negativity is. The second research question is derived.  
 
Research question 2: Does negativity in campaigns in the Netherlands mostly 
focus on character traits, issues or values, and has this changed over time?  
 
 
5. Negative campaigning and the democratic process  
 
In general, most people have negative associations with negative campaigning and its 
presumed rise. Many observers fear that negative campaigning harms the democratic 
process (Lau, Sigelman & Rovner, 2007) and many scientific studies have examined the 
effects of negative campaigning (e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Kahn & Kenney, 
2004; Lau & Pomper, 2004; Geer, 2006). Past research has mainly examined three ways 
in which negative campaigning may harm the political process. Negative campaigning is 
argued to have an effect on voter turnout, political efficacy and political cynicism (Lau et 
al., 1999; Lau, Sigelman & Rovner, 2007). 
 A high level of negativity in a campaign has an effect on the voter turnout (the 
percentage of the people who are entitled to vote, who actually vote). Ansolabehere and 
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Iyengar (1995) in their book ‘Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and 
Polarize the Electorate’ firstly point out that negative campaigning works for the U.S. 
Campaign ads give voters new information and enable them to evoke information they 
had previously stored. The authors then try to show their readers that campaigning works 
best when the message of the campaign is in agreement with voters’ existing political 
beliefs. Partisans are therefore less convinced by campaigns -their ideas only get 
reinforced- then are non-partisans, who do not or in a lesser extend have existing political 
beliefs. Ansolabehere and Iyengar then argue that negative campaigning decreases 
turnout, because it provides non-partisans with negative information and reinforces the 
negative assumptions non-partisans already had about politics. However, many studies 
claim to have not found support for this demobilization hypothesis (e.g., Brader, 2005; 
Brooks & Geer, 2007). Most of these studies base their conclusions on experiments and 
participants’ intended turnout, like Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) did. When looking 
at the total negativism in a campaign and its effects on voter turnout, the literature is 
divided. Some state that the total level of negative campaigning in an election campaign 
can be associated with turnout in that election (Finkel & Geer, 1998; Wattenberg & 
Brians, 1999; Brooks, 2006) while others state that the total amount of negativity in a 
campaign has no influence on the actual voter turnout (Djupe & Pederson, 2002; Kahn & 
Kenney, 2004; Lau & Pomper, 2004). 
The level of negativity in campaigns is also said to have an effect on the public’s 
political cynicism. Political cynicism is a lack of faith or trust in the government, in 
politicians, and/or in politics as a whole (Agger, Goldstein & Pearl, 1961). The 
functioning of the democratic system depends on the extent to which the public trusts the 
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government. A political system cannot function well when the political cynicism of the 
public is high over a long period of time. This can be devastating for the political system 
(Easton, 1965, cited in Schenk-Hamlin, Procter & Rumsey, 2000). Shapiro & Rieger 
(1989), Perloff and Kinsey (1992), Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995), Thorson et al., 
(2000), and Brader (2005) connect negative campaign advertising to trust in government. 
Negative campaigning might give a party or candidate a short-term advantage, but the 
respect that citizens have for all participating candidates or parties is reduced, because 
citizens find negative campaigning witless and irrelevant (Brader, 2005). Therefore, 
negative campaigning triggers a detachment from the lager political process (Shapiro & 
Rieger, 1989). Some studies, however, claim not to have found support for the relation 
between negativity and trust in government (e.g., Lau & Pomper, 2004; Geer, 2006). 
Political efficacy is a concept that is used to address the amount of impact citizens 
believe they have upon the political process. When the public has a low level of political 
efficacy, it is an indication that the public feels as though their political participation has 
no effect on the political process. When citizens believe that the actions they take do have 
an impact upon the actions of the government, their feeling of political efficacy is high. 
In literature, political efficacy is often divided into internal and external political efficacy. 
Internal efficacy incorporates how citizens feel towards their own abilities to affect the 
political process: do citizens understand politics and do they find themselves able to 
participate? External political efficacy, on the other hand, is people’s expectation that 
they have an influence on the political process when participating. The public might find 
negative campaigning, especially character trait focused negative campaigning, lacking 
usefulness (Pinkleton, Um & Austin, 2002). Being exposed to much negativity may 
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frustrate the public and frustrating experiences decrease efficacy (Pinkleton, Um & 
Austin, 2002). The public’s internal and external political efficacy is influenced by a high 
level of negative campaigning. Multiple studies have investigated this claim. 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) and Brader (2005), among others, found that negative 
campaigning decreases a person’s internal and external political efficacy. Others only 
partly support the claim and found that negative campaigning influences only a person’s 
external efficacy (e.g., Craig & Kane, 2000; Pinkleton, Um & Austin, 2002) or internal 
efficacy (e.g., Freedman & Goldstein, 1999; Thorson et al., 2000).  
It seems adequate to re-examine these three American-based hypotheses about the 
negative effects of negative campaigning in a multiparty system like the Netherlands in 
which the overall level of negativity is expected to be much lower. The negative effects 
may be present only when a certain level of negativity in campaigns is achieved.  
Most studies on the effects of negative campaigning use experiments, in which 
participants are exposed to one or more negative ads, or individual surveys to investigate 
these effects. However, the effects may very well be due to a general negative feeling of 
the public caused by the total amount of negativity in a whole campaign. People are 
influenced by a general high level of negativity. This study looks at the aggregated level 
of negativity and its possible effects on the aggregate level of actual voter turnout, 
political efficacy (internal and external), and political cynicism over time. The data in 
this study, however, does not allow one to make any direct causal claims regarding the 
relation between the total amount of negative campaigning and its effects on the political 
system, because this study does not take into account other factors that might have effects 
on the three depended variables. This study will, however, descriptively state 
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assumptions about the relationships and assess general trends when looking at the 
fluctuation (long term and short term) of the total level of negativity in campaigns over 
time and the fluctuation (long term and short term) of the three variables over time.  
 
Research question 3: Will the fluctuation of the total level of negativity in 
campaigns over time go hand in hand with the fluctuation of general voter turnout, 
political cynicism and internal and external political efficacy?  
 
 
6. Research methods, data & case selection  
 
To answer the three research questions a longitudinal study has been conducted. This 
longitudinal study consists of a quantitative content analysis of statements made by 
politicians or parties during election campaigns as reported in newspaper articles. The 
total level of negativity in campaigns as well as the focus of the negativity in multiple 
points in time was derived from the content analysis. Existing data was used to measure 
the general aggregated voter turnout, political efficacy and political cynicism for each 
election separately.  
 The analysis focuses on campaigns from all participating parties for Dutch 
parliamentary elections. These elections are the largest and most important elections in 
the Netherlands. Political parties spend most of their time and money on campaigning for 
parliamentary elections. For the other Dutch elections (the senate elections, the elections 
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of provincial executives, the municipal elections, the European elections, and the election 
of the dike boards) less campaigning is being conducted (Elzinga & Voerman, 2002: 2). 
The analysis starts from the campaign of the 1971 Dutch parliamentary election, 
and covers a total of thirteen election campaigns (each parliamentary election campaign 
after 1970 until now). The election of 1971 was the first one in which citizens were not 
obligated by law to vote. Non-compulsorily voting is necessary because this study also 
looks at the effect of negative campaigning on the actual voter turnout in an election. 
There also was a more practical reason to start the analysis from the 1971 election 
onwards; Dutch newspapers published since 1971 onwards were archived and available.   
 There are different ways to measure the tone of campaigns that have been used in 
studies about negative campaigning; such as measuring media coverage, political 
advertisement, or citizens’ perception (Ridout & Franz, 2008). A proxy measure of 
negativity is chosen in this study. Statements made by political parties or politicians 
during a campaign which have been mentioned or quoted in national newspaper articles 
covering the campaign, were analyzed to determine the level of negativity in a campaign 
(others that use this proxy measure: e.g., Kahn & Kenny, 1999; Lau & Pomper, 2004; 
Buell & Sigelman, 2008). 
 There are several reasons for using a newspaper-based assessment of campaign 
tone. The aim of this study is to state something about the level of negativity and its 
possible consequences for the political system. Few people actually perceive the 
campaign directly. Most hear or read about it in the (news) media. The campaign that is 
perceived by the public is different from the real campaign launched by the different 
parties (Popkin, 1991). The way in which it is reported in the media is very often how 
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citizens actually perceive and experience the campaign (Ridout & Franz, 2008). The tone 
people perceive of the campaign is what is important in this study and therefore is chosen 
to analyze newspaper coverage. Analysis of television news would also have satisfied the 
requirement of ‘perceived tone of the campaign by the public’ but are not available for 
the Netherlands over a longer period of time; Dutch newspapers on the other hand are. 
Newspapers give a very comprehensive view of a campaign (Ridout & Franz, 2008). 
Instead of just analyzing one way of the various ways parties campaign, for example the 
analysis of debates, newspapers cover many different campaign activities (Walter & 
Vliegenthart, 2010). Ridout & Franz (2008) studied different measures of campaign tone 
and concluded that all measures (either derived from analysis of media coverage, political 
advertisement or citizens’ perception) correlate with each other. The tone of newspaper 
coverage about campaigns is a good reflection of the campaign tone itself (Ridout & 
Franz, 2008).  
There are, of course, also disadvantages to analyzing statements in newspaper 
articles to measure the level of negativity in campaigns, which are taken into account. 
There is a tendency among reporters to emphasize negativity (Ridout & Franz, 2008). 
Especially when in the 1990’s the media logic made its appearance in the Netherlands, in 
which the media not only encourage the use of negative campaigning by politicians and 
political parties, but are also more prone to cover negative appeals. Reporters are more 
prone to cover negative statements than positive ones, because negative campaigning 
sells better than positive campaigning does. Negativity is claimed to be more newsworthy 
than positive statements (West, 2005: 69). However the definition of newsworthiness 
journalists use is not consistent and, in almost all cases, journalists make a decision of 
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newsworthiness based on different values (Buell & Sigelman, 2008). It is impossible to 
determine which campaign statements of political parties or politicians are not published 
by the media (and are therefore left out of the analysis) and whether these missing 
statements will have had a systematic effect on this analysis. Moreover, the media logic 
in which the conflict criterion is of high importance for the journalists’ decision to cover 
an issue or not, is a phenomenon that is more obvious in the television landscape (Koole, 
2006). Newspapers are known to be more objective and still have the feeling of 
responsibility to bring qualitative and objective news to their readers.  
The unit of analysis from which the campaign tone is derived is any statement, or 
appeal, made by a politician or political party presented in a newspaper article. A 
statement, or an appeal, is an explicit expression or claim by a politician or political party 
which states why a voter should vote for a certain party or not (Geer, 2006, see also 
Walter, 2009). Only statements made by politicians or political parties are taken into 
account. The analysis does not include statements made by the writer of the article or any 
other actors in the article. Appeals made by interest groups such as labor unions are also 
excluded from the analysis because negative campaigning is conceptualized as a strategy 
which only parties or politicians may or may not use to derive votes.  
Statements in articles covering the campaign in De Telegraaf were analyzed. De 
Telegraaf is the daily newspaper with the largest circulation in the Netherlands. The 
analysis was conducted for articles that were published in the four weeks prior to the 
election day. This time span is most logical since parties tend to start campaigning one 
month prior to election day in the Netherland (van Praag, 2005; see also Walter & 
Vliegenthart, 2010).  
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Articles in the Telegraaf were available online via the Electronic Database 
LexisNexis for the campaigns of 2002 and onwards. The search engine LexisNexis was 
used to select the articles that covered the campaign by searching for the words 
‘campaign’ or ‘election’ in the article. To aim at statements or appeals from parties or 
politicians in the articles, at least one of the names of the, in that campaign participating, 
political parties should also be mentioned in the article (e.g., Walter & Vliegenthart, 2010; 
Tue Pedersen, 2011).  
For the election years before the election of 2002, the newspaper archive in the 
Koninklijke Bibliotheek (KB) in The Hague was used. The coder scanned all Telegraaf 
editions that were published four weeks before every election day since 1971 and 
selected the articles that covered the campaign and coded the statements in those articles. 
Articles that covered the campaign but did not contain any statements made by politicians 
or political parties were discarded.  
On average, eighty articles about the campaign per election year were published 
in De Telegraaf. Each article covering the campaign contained an average of 
approximately three statements made by politicians or political parties. On average 
approximately 230 statements were coded per election year. De Telegraaf contained 
about ten statements each day. The coverage of the elections in De Telegraaf rose 
steadily as election day came nearer. A total of 2986 statements, originating from 1044 
articles, were coded. 
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7. Operationalization and measurements 
 
Negative campaigning is defined as ‘negative references of political parties or politicians 
directed at other politicians, political parties, groups of parties, or the coalition’, while 
positive campaigning is defined as ‘any other form of campaign communication by 
politicians or political parties’ (this definition has also been used by: Geer, 2006; Hansen 
& Tue Pedersen, 2008; Walter & Vliegenthart, 2010; Tue Pedersen, 2011). For example, 
in an appeal (an explicit expression or claim from a politician or political party in which 
is put forward why a voter should vote for a certain party or not) politician X is 
criticizing the environmental policies of party Y and is therefore campaigning negatively, 
while politician Z is presenting his or her own policy and therefore is campaigning 
positive. Using this clear definition, statements or appeals made by politicians or political 
parties in articles in De Telegraaf were coded as (1) ‘statement of a politician or a 
political party in the article is positive (references to a party or politician praising 
him/herself, i.e. positive campaigning)’, (2) ‘statement of a politician or a political party 
in the article is negative (references to a party or politician criticizing an opponent party, 
politician, group of parties, or the coalition, i.e. negative campaigning)’, or (3) ‘statement 
of a politician or a political party is both negative and positive (statement in which a party 
or politician criticizes another party and in which the own party is praised)’.  
When a member of party A criticizes another member of party A, this is not an 
appeal because it does not hold an argument concerning why a voter should vote for a 
certain party or not and is thus not taken into account. When party A states something 
positive about party B, however, this is seen as a positive statement because (for 
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whatever reason) a party positively puts forward why a voter should vote for a certain 
party. However, such examples were not encountered during the content analysis.  
Each campaign was attributed a number varying from 0 to 100 percent. When a 
campaign was attributed a number of a 0 percent, it would mean that in that campaign 0 
percent of the total amount of statements or appeals made by politicians or political 
parties in articles covering the campaign in the month prior to the election in De 
Telegraaf was coded as (2) (negative). When a campaign was attributed 100 percent, it 
would mean that all statements in the coverage of the campaign in De Telegraaf were 
coded as (2) (negative). Each of the thirteen campaigns was attributed a number varying 
between 0 percent (the campaign had no negativity) to 100 percent (the campaign was 
exclusively negative) to address the level of negativity in each campaign. The tone of the 
campaign is a number between 0 and 100 percent. The higher the number, the more 
negative the tone of the campaign1.  
The statements made by politicians or political parties in the article, either coded 
as positive or negative, were then coded as (1) ‘is focusing on issue (statement about 
specific policies like taxation, environment, or immigration)’, (2) ‘is focusing on value 
(statement about broad theme such as hope and change)’, (3) ‘is focusing on character 
trait (statement about a party’s or politicians characteristics)’ (coding based on: Geer, 
2006; Walter, 2009; Walter & Vliegenthart, 2010). A fourth category (4) (else) covers 
statements that cannot be classified as any of the three above mentioned categories.  
The focus of the campaign tone is derived per election year as percentages of all 
negative appeals in that election year: X percent of the total amount of negative appeals 
                                                  
1 Mixed appeals (28 is total) were not categorized as negative appeals, so were not encountered in the 
percentage number that represents the level of negativity in an election campaign.  
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of election year X covered in the analysis focus on (1) issue, X percent on (2) value, X 
percent on (3) character trait, and X percent of all negative appeals in that election year 
focus on (4) else. This has also been done for appeals or statements coded as ‘positive’. 
This method makes it possible to see whether the focus of the appeals differs between 
positive and negative campaigning and whether the focus of positive and negative 
campaigning has changed over time.  
Then we look at the other variables in this study. Voter turnout data for the Dutch 
parliamentary elections from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) was used to measure voter turnout. The merged NKO (The Dutch 
Parliamentary Elections Studies) panel survey dataset 1971-2006 was used to measure 
the variables political cynicism and political efficacy (internal and external). The NKO 
measured these variables after the elections, so after the election campaign, of a given 
election year. This makes it possible to look at possible consequences of the level of 
negativity in a campaign on the depended variables. Participant in the NKO were asked 
to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements ‘Although they 
know better, politicians promise more than they can deliver.’, ‘Ministers and state 
secretaries are primarily concerned about their personal interests.’, and ‘One is more 
likely to become a member of parliament because of one’s political friends than because 
of one’s abilities’, to measure political cynicism. Political efficacy (internal and external) 
was measured using participants extent of agreement on statements like ‘Members of 
parliament do not care about the opinions of people like me.’, ‘People like me have 
absolutely no influence on governmental policy.’, and ‘I am well qualified to play an 
active role in politics’.  
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The data of the NKO panel survey of 2010 was added to this dataset. For every 
election year the sample mean of the internal political efficacy scores, the external 
political efficacy score and the mean of the political cynicisms scores was calculated and 
used in the analysis. Questions related to political cynicism have been asked in the NKO-
surveys since 1977 and were not asked for the 1982 election. Questions covering internal 
political efficacy have been asked since the 1994 election. These missing years do not 
matter because enough years are left to detect any resemblance in fluctuations. The 
external political efficacy score was rescaled because there was one question used to 
calculate the external political efficacy score with, not asked in the NKO of 2010. See 
Appendix 4 for more information about the questions asked in the NKO and the rescaling. 
When analyzing whether the fluctuation of the level of negativity and the fluctuations of 
the four variables resemble a distinction is made between long term effects and short term 
fluctuations of the variables.  
 
 
8. Results  
 
8.1 The level of negativity  
 
As has been stated before, many people assume that the level of negativity used by 
politicians or political parties in election campaigns is on the rise in the Netherlands. 
However, two competing hypotheses have been derived. One hypothesis states that the 
level of negativity is indeed on the rise and the other hypothesis states that the level of 
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negativity has remained stable over time. So, is there a rise in the level of negativity in 
Dutch election campaigns? What does the content analysis tell us?  
 
 
Table 1: Tone of Statements   
 Frequency  Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentages 
Positive Statements 1858 62.2 62.2 
Negative Statements  1100 36.8 99.1 
Mixed Statements  28  0.9 100.0 
Total  2986 100.0  
 
 
In total, 2986 statements made by politicians or political parties covered in De Telegraaf 
were coded. As presented in table 1, 1858 statements, 62.2 percent of the total number of 
statements, were positive and 1100, 36.8 percent of the total number of statements, were 
coded as negative.  
 Is a rise in the level of negativity detectable in the Netherland? Figure 1 implies 
that it is. There is an apparent rise in the relative number of negative statements made by 
Dutch politicians and political parties in parliamentary election campaigns. A regression 
analysis supports this conclusion (R = .728). A linear trend can be drawn through the 
levels of negativity in Dutch election campaigns from 1971 till 2010.  
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Figure 1: Level of Negativity in Dutch Parliamentary Election Campaigns 1971-
2010
 
 
 The conventional perception that negativity in election campaigns is not just an 
American phenomenon but something that is also on the rise in the Netherlands seems, 
according to these results, to be true. The first hypothesis, The level of negativity in 
election campaigns in the Netherlands has increased over time (a trend will be detectable) 
(H1), is supported and the second hypothesis, The level of negativity in election 
campaigns in the Netherlands has not increased over time (a trend will not be detectable) 
(H2) is not. When leaving out the relative low 1971 election campaign (R = .654), one 
can clearly see that no change occurred in the 70’s and 80’s, and that the trend started 
from the 1990’s onwards.  
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The scatter around the trend, however, increases over time. Two specific cases 
need some more examination to see if the trend is valid. In 2003, the level of negativity is 
very low. Just 33.50 percent of the total number of statements were negative. This is just 
as low as the level of negativity was in the 1982 election campaign. It looks as though the 
election campaign in 2003 was preformed twenty years earlier. When looking at the 2003 
campaign, it seems like a rise in the level of negativity did not occur at all. The level of 
negativity of the 2006 election campaigns, on the other hand, was very high: 52.90 
percent. It was the first (and only) time that negative campaigning even suppressed 
positive campaigning. The high level of negativity in the 2006 election campaigns might 
be decisive why the trend of a rising level of negativity is detectable during time and, 
when not justified, might influence the rising trend illegitimately. When leaving out the 
two outliers (election years 2003 and 2006) the slope of the trend increases (R= .842). 
Can these two extreme levels of negativity be explained?  
 
 
8.1.1 The 2003 parliamentary election campaign  
 
A few different contextual factors might explain why the level of negativity in 2003 was 
relatively low. Firstly and probably most importantly, is the influence of the assassination 
of Pim Fortuyn during the 2002 national election campaign on the Dutch election 
campaign of 2003. Because 2002 was such a dramatic year, the election campaign of the 
parliamentary elections in 2003 was more serene and less negative. Just before the 
parliamentary elections in 2002, the political leader of the right-wing political party Lijst 
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Pim Fortuyn (LPF) was assassinated, a dramatic event that shocked everyone, especially 
politicians. Fortuyn provoked controversy with his views on multiculturalism, 
immigration and the Islam in the Netherlands. The parties in the political establishment, 
in the eyes of many, had used to much negative campaigning against Fortuyn and Dutch 
journalists and politicians, the leftist politicians especially, were blamed for ‘demonizing’ 
Fortuyn (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 2004).  
Besides accusations made by many regarding politics in general, the Dutch 
lawyers Spong and Hammerstein, in name of the LPF board, pressed charges against a 
few politicians for incitement to hatred against Fortuyn (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 
2004). Charges were pressed among others against Tom de Graaf from the Democrats ’66 
(D66), Bas Eenhoorn of the Liberal Party (VVD), Marcel van Dam of the Labour Party 
(PvdA), and Rob Oudkerk also of the Labour Party (PvdA). The charges were dismissed, 
even in higher appeal, but the politicians received a warning about their negative tone. 
The book that Spong and Hammerstein presented later that year, titled ‘Vervolg ze tot hel, 
De haat-zaai aangifte van Fortuyn’, clarified that Fortuyn himself also wanted to press 
charges against Paul Rosenmöller of the Green Left Party (GroenLinks), Wim Kok of the 
Labour Party (PvdA) and especially against Ad Melkert also of the Labour Party (PvdA) 
(Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 2004). The three, according to Fortuyn, had repeatedly 
compared him to right extremists populists such as French politician Le Pen and during 
the 2002 campaign tried to demonize him with their negative campaigns aimed at him. 
Both left-wing and right-wing parties and politicians were shocked by the 
consequences of too much negativity and were shocked by the official and unofficial 
accusations made against them. After the dramatic event in 2002, the public was shocked 
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by the extreme hardening of Dutch politics and its campaigns. Negative campaigning was 
seen as malicious. Political parties found that negative campaigning would, therefore, not 
be beneficial (anymore). Not going negative, or not going too negative, after the dramatic 
event in 2002, was, besides being regarded by the political parties as more beneficial also 
regarded as suited considering the circumstances.  
The relatively low level of negativity in the 2003 short parliamentary election 
campaign after the fall of Cabinet Balkenende1 can also be attributed to the high level of 
parties’ self-criticism in the 2003 election campaigns. The LPF built its 2003 campaign 
around the motto: ‘We have made mistakes in the past coalition, but are willing to change. 
Give us another chance.’ (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 2004). The Labour Party (PvdA) 
was also self-critical. It geared its campaign towards restoring the trust in the party 
(Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 2003). This self-criticism of several parties took the wind 
out of the sails for other parties to go negative on them.  
 One theme was central for all parties in the 2003 parliamentary election campaign: 
the economy. The Centraal Planbureau (CPB), just before the campaign started, presented 
poor results on the social-economic and financial policy of the Netherlands (Hippe, 
Lucardie & Voerman, 2004). All parties agreed on the fact that cuts ought to be made. 
The parties shared a common feeling of responsibility to restore the Dutch economy, as 
they do know in 2012. They only disagreed about smaller issues on how to restore the 
economy. Hence negativity was discouraged.  
Blaming the incumbents (note that the Cabinet had already fallen) for the bad 
economic situation was difficult because most parties agreed that the failure of the 
Cabinet Balkenende1 was due to problems within the LPF (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 
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2004). No party or politician, however, dared to go negative on the LPF and the LPF 
already criticized themselves. 
Besides this, the CPB had no time to consider the proposals of the different 
participating political parties regarding the cuts (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 2004). No 
negative appeals from parties against other parties on this very important matter could be 
made, because all information was speculative and negative attacks could not be 
substantiated. This also discouraged the use of negativity by political parties and 
politicians in the 2003 election campaign. 
  That the 2003 election campaign was relatively less negative and does not seem 
to follow the trend can be explained well.  
 
 
8.1.2 The 2006 parliamentary election campaign 
 
The 2006 parliamentary election campaign was almost twenty percentage points more 
negative than the previous election campaign of 2003. Negativity even outran positive 
campaigning in this campaign year. The 2006 election campaign has been known for its 
sharpness (Lucardie et al., 2008) and this has also become clear from the content analysis. 
Different factors in the 2006 parliamentary election campaign can explain why the 
measured level of negativity was relatively high, making the campaign resemble an 
American campaign.  
First of all, during the 2006 election campaign, there was a large battle between 
the two major parties running for office: the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Labour 
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Party (PvdA). The two parties were very close to each other in the polls and both had, up 
until late in the election campaign, a chance to become the largest party (Lucardie et al., 
2008). In a close race negativity is used more often (Peterson & Djupe, 2005). A lot is at 
stake in a close race and the parties will try to do everything to gain those last few votes 
they need to become the largest party (Peterson & Djupe, 2005). In the first debate 
between party leaders on NOS Radio 1, held in the first days of the campaign, 
Balkenende, the party leader of the Christian Democrats, accused Bos, party leader of the 
Labour Party, of switching and lying (‘U draait en u bent niet eerlijk’). Member of 
Parliament Verhagen (Christian Democrats) used the slogan: ‘You will regret voting for 
Bos’ (‘Met Bos bent u de klos’). Balkenende in a debate also stated to be pleased that Bos 
finally revealed his true colours, but that they were the wrong ones (‘Het is goed dat Bos 
nu eindelijk eens kleur bekent, het is alleen wel de verkeerde kleur’). Bos, in turn, let the 
voters know that he would refuse to serve in a coalition with the Christian Democrats. 
Bos complained about the negativity and stated that the Christian Democrats, as well as 
the Liberal Party (VVD), tried to discredit him as a person (‘Het CDA en de VVD 
proberen mij als persoon kapot te maken’). Negativity was used often by the two large 
parties as a strategy to win a very close race.  
Because the focus of the campaign and its coverage was almost exclusively on the 
battle between the Christian Democrats and the Labour Party, other parties tried hard to 
gain attention. The Liberal Party and other parties used much negativity in their 
campaigns as a strategy to gain attention (Lucardie et al., 2008). Political parties and their 
campaign strategists know that negativity sells better to the public, and that the media are 
therefore more prone to publish negativity (West, 2005: 69). 
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Thirdly, the 2006 election campaign is considered to be highly personalized (Van 
Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2008). The whole campaign and its media coverage were centred 
on the battle between Bos (the leader of the Labour Party) and Balkenende (the leader of 
the Christian Democratic Appeal) instead of a battle between the two parties they 
represented. For example, the Christian Democrats used Balkenende’s personality as a 
selling point in their campaign (Lucardie et al., 2008). Balkenende was the centre of the 
CDA campaign. There even were T-shirts with Balkenende’s face on it, and life-size 
cardboard figures of him were distributed on a large scale. In 2003, Balkenende refused 
to participate in non-political programs like cooking shows (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 
2004), but in 2006, strikingly, he co-hosted the gossip program RTL Boulevard and 
participated in many game shows and entertainment shows (Lucardie et al., 2008). 
Balkenende even had more than 3000 friends on the Dutch social network Hyves. 
Negative attacks are more effective when performed on individuals instead of on parties, 
and are therefore performed more on persons than on parties (Hansen & Tue Pedersen, 
2008). The high level of personalization, therefore, encouraged the use of negativity in 
the 2006 parliamentary election campaign.  
 The 2006 election campaign was characterized by internal critique and internal 
disagreement within different parties (Lucardie et al., 2008). Internal disagreement and 
critique within a party makes it an easy target for other parties. The Liberal Party was 
divided between supporters of party leader Rutte and supporters of Verdonk, who had 
just lost the very close partly leader election. Rutte had won with 51 percent, but Verdonk 
gained 47 percent of the votes. Almost half of the party members of the Labour Party 
(VVD) were dissatisfied with Rutte, and he received much criticism from (prominent) 
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party members. According to them, Rutte was not harsh enough and did not adequately 
represent liberal values. Similarly, the Labour Party (PvdA) leader Bos became more 
vulnerable to criticism by other parties due to criticism he received from his own party 
(Lucardie et al., 2008). According to prominent party members of the Labour Party, like 
Marcel van Dam, Bram Peper, and Willem Vermeend, their party was not being 
forthright with the public about certain policies and about their preferred coalition. Bos 
was blamed for the same issues by other parties. Opposing parties only had to echo these 
internal critiques, making negativity towards internally divided parties very easy.  
 The high level of negativity in the 2006 election campaign can also be explained 
by contextual factors.   
 
 
8.1.3 Conclusion 
 
Dutch campaign culture has become more negative during time. The contextual factors 
mentioned above can explain the two extreme levels of negativity in the parliamentary 
election campaigns of 2003 and 2006. A clear rise in the amount of negativity used in 
Dutch election campaigns, since the 1990’s, is detectable. Hypothesis 1 is supported and 
Hypothesis 2 is not. The Dutch political culture of mutual respect and consensus and the 
multiparty system does not refrain political parties from using negativity to a greater 
extent. Positive campaigning, however, is (except for the 2006 election campaign, where 
negative campaigning suppressed positive campaigning) still the most preferred method 
of parties to distinguish themselves.  
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8.2 Issue, value or character trait? 
 
Research Question 2 investigate whether the negativity used by the Dutch politicians and 
political parties is mostly focused on character traits, issues or values. Negative 
campaigning focusing on character traits is seen as more negative than negative 
campaigning which focuses on content (issues and values). 
When looking at the statements, both negative and positive ones, we see that of 
the 2986 statements coded, 1990 statements (66.6 percent, a large majority) addresses an 
issue. 169 statements (5.7 percent) focuses on values (see Table 2). Character traits are 
the focus of only 644 statements, 21.6 percent of the total number of campaign statements 
made by politicians and political parties from 1971 through 2010 covered in De Telegraaf.  
 
Table 2: Focus of Statements  
 Frequency  Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
Issue  1990 66.6 66.6 
Value  169 5.7 72.3 
Character Trait  644 21.6 93.9 
Else  183 6.1 100.0 
Total  2986 100.0  
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Figure 2 shows the focus of both the 1858 positive and the 1100 negative 
statements separately. As this figure shows, issues are the main focus of both positive and 
negative appeals. A majority of the statements focuses on issues. Namely, 77.66 percent 
of the positive appeals focus on issues, and 48.45 percent of the negative statements 
focuses on issues. Although negative statements focus more on issues than on character 
traits (respectively 48.45 and 38.09 percent), negative campaigning in general focuses 
more than three times as much on character traits than does positive campaigning 
(respectively 38.09 and 11.84 percent).  
 
 
Figure 2: Focus of negative and positive statements in Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Campaigns 1971-2010 
 
 47 
Has the focus of negative statements differed over time? When we look at Figure 
3, we see that statements focusing on content (issue and value) in all represented election 
campaigns outnumber statements focusing on character traits. Striking is the large 
percentage in 1977. In this election campaign 61 percent of the statements focused on 
character traits and the focus on character traits outnumbered the focus on values and 
issues.  
 
 
Figure 3: Focus of Negative Statements in Dutch Parliamentary Election Campaigns 
from 1971-2010 
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Geer (2006: 63-65) hypothesized that negative campaigning would increasingly 
focus on character traits, making negative attacks seem more harsh. As figure 3 shows, 
the focus of negative appeals made by politicians and political parties in election 
campaigns from 1971 through 2010, differed over time, but there is no trend in the 
amount of character trait appeals over time. This also becomes obvious when running a 
regression analysis to see whether time (election year) and the amount of focus on 
character traits are related (R is not significant). There is no increase in the number of 
character trait attacks. The same is concluded by Geer (2006: 68), Benoit (1999: 286), 
Klotz (1998) and Van Heerde-Hudson (2011). 
Although there is a clear increase in the use of negativity, as shows from the 
content analysis of statements made by politicians and political parties, the negative 
statements, except the 1977 election campaign, have consistently focused more on 
content (issues and values) than on character traits, and the number of statements 
focusing on character traits has not increased over time. This makes the increase seem 
less bad and the consequences of a rising level of negativity for the democratic process 
might therefore be smaller. When looking at the possible consequences of negative 
campaigning on the democratic process we continue to look at the total amount of 
negativity because there is no significant change in the focus of the negativity.  
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8.3 The consequences of negativity for the democratic process 
 
Did the fluctuating levels of the total level of negativity in Dutch election campaigns 
during time go hand in hand with the fluctuations in general voter turnout, political 
cynicism and internal and external political efficacy in the Netherlands? To mention it 
again, because the data does not allow it, in this study no causal claims regarding the 
relation between the total amount of negative campaigning and its effects on the political 
system will be made. Because this study does not take into account any other factors that 
might have effects on the three dependent variables, this would be impossible to do. We 
look at the long term effects and the short term fluctuations of the three variables in 
election years and compare those to the long term effects and short term fluctuation of the 
total level of negativity in election campaigns over time.   
 
 
8.3.1 Voter turnout  
 
The demobilization hypothesis, explained in an earlier section of this thesis, hypothesizes 
that when the level of negativity is higher, voter turnout is expected to be lower. Does 
this show from the fluctuations of both variables in the Netherlands from 1971 through 
2010? 
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Figure 4: Level of Negativity and Voter Turnout in Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Campaigns 1971-2010 
 
 
In general, voter turnout2  decreased from 1971 through 2010 (R = -.58), see  
figure 4. This decrease in voter turnout is in accordance with the demobilization 
hypothesis which states that the voter turnout decreases when the level of negativity 
increases. The level of negativity increased during the same period (R = .728), see also 
figure 4. 
                                                  
2 The variance in voter turnout from 1971 until 2010 is relatively small. The highest voter 
turnout was in 1977, 88 percent of the eligible voters cast a ballot in that election. The 
lowest voter turnout was in 1998. In the parliamentary election of 1998 only 73 percent 
of the eligible voters went to the polls on Election Day. This makes the largest difference 
15 percentage points. Regarding a hundred point scale, this is not much.  
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However, looking at specific cases to see whether the fluctuation between voter 
turnout and the level of negativity in campaigns corresponds leads to another conclusion. 
The highest level of negativity was found in 2006. In that year the level of negativity was 
53 percent. According to the US-based demobilization hypothesis, one would expect that 
voter turnout in 2006 was very low, maybe even the lowest in the covered time period. 
However, the voter turnout in the 2006 parliamentary election was 80 percent, which was 
relatively high. Especially considering the following election year 2010 in which the 
turnout was 75 percent, the voter turnout in 2006 was surprisingly high. The lowest 
turnout, which one would expect to be in 2006, was actually in 1998 (73 percent). The 
level of negativity in 1998 was higher than in the surrounding years, and the voter turnout 
was lower in 1998 than in the years before and after. However, the level of negativity in 
1998, 39 percent, was in accordance with the rising trend but not exceptionally high. 
Strikingly, however, was the low level of voter turnout in 1998. The low level of 
negativity of 34 percent in 2003 is not reflected in the percentage of voter turnout either. 
One would expect the voter turnout in 2003 not to be in accordance with the decreasing 
trend in turnout but to be increasing because the negativity was low. The voter turnout in 
2003 increases in comparison to the year before, from 79 percent in 2002 to 80 percent in 
2003. However, the small increase is not comparable to the large decrease in the level of 
negativity in 2003. One would expect the highest voter turnout, in accordance with the 
presumption that when negativity is low, the voter turnout is higher, to occur in 2003. 
However, the highest voter turnout was in 1977 and 1981 (respectively 88 and 87 
percent). The levels of negativity in 1977 and 1981 were relatively low (respectively 34 
and 37 percent). Also in 1986 the voter turnout was high (86 percent) and the level of 
 52 
negativity relatively low (34 percent). We now look at the increased negativity level of 
the 2003 election campaign through the 2006 election campaign (from 34 percent to 53 
percent). One would expect, in accordance with the demobilization presumption, to see 
the largest drop in voter turnout between these years. However this is not the case. From 
2003 to 2006 voter turnout did not drop at all, but actually increased a little (from 80.04 
to 80.35 percent). Also when looking at the largest decrease in voter turnout, the 
demobilization presumption should perhaps be questioned. From 1981 to 1982 voter 
turnout dropped from 87 percent to 81 percent. One would expect that the level of 
negativity from 1981 till 1982 would have greatly increased, explaining the large drop in 
voter turnout. However, the level of negativity dropped from 79 to 73 percent from 1981 
and 1982. The largest decrease in the level of negativity was from 2006 to 2010. The 
level of negativity dropped from 53 to 43 percent. The voter turnout, not in accordance 
with the demobilization presumption dropped as well. The voter turnout decreased 
substantially from 80 percent in 2006 to 75 percent in 2010.  
This described non-resemblance of the short term fluctuations in the two variables 
is supported by a correlation analysis. A bivariate correlation analysis of the changes in 
the scores from election to election between the two variables is done to see whether the 
changes in the two series look alike. The short term fluctuations in the level of negativity 
are not related to the short term fluctuations in the voter turnout (R is not significant).  
To summarize, when looking only at the general trends of both variables, the 
fluctuation of voter turnout and the level of negativity corresponds. The level of 
negativity used in campaigns increased over time, while the voter turnout decreased over 
the same period. However, when looking at short term changes one can conclude that the 
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fluctuations of the two variables do not correspond significantly. Other factors have 
clearly had a big influence on voter turnout. The influence of negativity on voter turnout, 
based on this descriptive analysis, seems small.  
 
 
8.3.2 Political cynicism 
 
Political cynicism, meaning the public’s lack of faith or trust in the government, in 
politicians, and/or the political system as a whole, is claimed to increase when the level 
of negativity increases and vice versa. Can we detect evidence in the fluctuations of the 
two variables that this hypothesis specific to American politics holds true in the 
Netherlands?  
First is looked at the general trends in the level of negativity and the public’s 
political cynicism3 (see figure 5). Just as with voter turnout, when looking only at the 
general trends one might assume that the US-based assumption also holds in the 
Netherlands. The level of negativity used in campaign has increased from 1977 till 2010 
(R = .630), as did the public’s political cynicism (R = .855). 
We look at striking cases in both variables to see if this preliminary conclusion 
holds. The highest level of negativity occurred in the 2006 parliamentary election 
campaign (53 percent). The public’s political cynicism in that year also peaked (1.71). 
However, in the election year after 2006 (2010) the political cynicism score increased a 
                                                  
3 The variance in political cynicism might from the figure look large, but is in fact 
relatively small. Keeping in mind that this is a four point scale, the largest difference 
of .34, is not very large. The lowest score of political cynicism was measured in 1981 
(1.39) and the highest in 2010 (1.73).  
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Figure 5: Level of Negativity and Political Cynicism in Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Campaigns 1977-2010 
 
Note: The public’s Political Cynicism is measured via the NKO since 1977 and was not measured in 1984. 
 
 
little further (to 1.73), but the level of negativity dropped (from 53 to 43 percent). The 
latter is not in accordance with the US based presumption that when the level of 
negativity increases, the public’s political cynicism also increases. A strikingly low level 
of negativity was found in 2003 (33 percent). The political cynicism score in 2003 (1.54) 
was also relatively low in comparison with the years before and after. The largest 
decrease in political cynicism occurred from 2002 to 2003 (political cynicism decreased 
from 1.68 to 1.54). The level of negativity also decreased significantly during the same 
period (from 38 to 33 percent). The fluctuations seem to support the presumption; when 
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the level of negativity increases, the public’s cynicism increases as well. However, the 
decrease of negativity from 2006 to 2010 and the increase in political cynicism between 
those years shows one other counterpart. Besides the biggest increase in the public’s 
political cynicism another one can be found between the elections of 1981 and 1986 
(from 1.39 to 1.55). One would expect this increase to be due to an increase of the 
negativity level. However, the negativity in that period decreased from 37 percent in 
1981 to 34 percent in 1986. Also from 1998 to 2002 the political cynicism increased large 
(from 1.52 to 1.68) while the level of negativity decreased (from 39 percent in 1998 to 38 
percent in 2002).  
  That the short term fluctuations of the two variables do not seem to relate also 
becomes clear when performing a bivariate correlation analysis between the short term 
changes in each variable (R is not significant).  
When looking at the general trend and at specific cases in the data, the fluctuation 
(long term and short term) of both variables overlaps, but does so a little. It seems that the 
level of negativity has an influence on political cynicism but the level of negativity 
clearly is not the only possible explanatory factor of political cynicism.  
 
 
8.3.3 Internal political efficacy  
 
The public’s internal political efficacy, people’s belief that they are able to participate in 
politics, is presumed to decrease when the public is exposed to a large level of negativity. 
When the level of negativity in campaigns is relatively small, the public’s feeling of 
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external political efficacy is said to increase. When looking at the fluctuation over time of 
internal political efficacy and level of negativity in campaigns, is this US-based 
assumption detectable in the Netherlands?  
Although the trend in internal political efficacy4 is not very clear, the public’s 
internal political efficacy has increased in the period from 1994 until 2010 (R = .560). 
The level of negativity has also increased during this period (R = .516) (see also figure 6). 
This is not in agreement with the US-based presumption that when the level of negativity 
increases over time, the public’s internal political efficacy decreases over that period of 
time.  
However, when looking at notable cases of both variables, a very clear 
correspondence between the short term fluctuations can be detected. A striking case is the 
large (and only) decrease in internal political efficacy from 2003 to 2006 (from 1.55 to 
1.20). This decrease corresponds to the largest increase of the level of negativity which 
also occurred from 2003 to 2006 (from 34 percent to 53 percent). In 2006, the public’s 
internal political efficacy was relatively low, the second lowest since 1994 in fact, and the 
level of negativity was highest in 2006. The largest drop in the level of negativity 
occurred between 2006 and 2010. It dropped from 53 percent in 2006 to 43 percent in 
2010. A clear correspondence, since the largest increase of the public’s internal political 
efficacy also occurred between 2006 and 2010. The public’s internal political efficacy 
increased from 1.20 in 2006 to 1.51 in 2010. From 1998 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2003 
the level of negativity decreased, which corresponds with the increase of the internal 
                                                  
4 The variance in the public’s internal political efficacy is relatively large in six measures. 
The highest political efficacy score was 1.55 in 2003 and the lowest was 1.12 in 1994. A 
difference of .43 on a four point scale.  
 57 
Figure 6: Level of Negativity and Internal Political Efficacy in Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Campaigns 1994-2010  
 
Note: The public’s Internal Political Efficacy is measured via the NKO since 1994. 
 
 
political efficacy in those periods. The only fluctuation that is not in accordance with the 
US based presumption (when the level of negativity increases, the public’s internal 
political efficacy decreases) is the 1994-1998 case, in which the public’s internal efficacy 
rises (from 1.12 to 1.26) and so does the level of negativity (from 37 to 39 percent). 
 A bivariate correlation analysis of the short term changes of the two variables also 
point out that there is a clear resemblance between the short term fluctuation of the level 
of negativity and the public’s internal political efficacy (R = -.957).  
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 The resemblance between the short term fluctuations of the two variables is 
notable. Although it is not detectable when only looking at general trends, the specific 
cases of the two variables show that the public’s internal political efficacy rises when the 
level of negativity decreases, however one has to keep in mind the short time period. The 
assumption that the level of negativity influences the public’s internal political efficacy 
seems to be true for the Netherlands.  
 
 
8.3.4 External political efficacy 
 
The public’s external political efficacy (people’s belief that they have an influence on the 
political process when participating in politics), is presumed to decrease when the public 
is exposed to a large level of negativity. When the level of negativity in campaigns is 
relatively smaller, however the public’s feeling of external political efficacy is presumed 
to increase. Is this US-based claim detectable in the Netherlands when looking at the 
fluctuation of both variables over time?  
Over time, the level of negativity that people were exposed to increased from 
1971 to 2010 (R = .728). The level of external political efficacy5 decreased over the same 
period of time (R = -.854) (see also figure 6). The US-based assumption that a high level 
of negativity decreases the public’s external political efficacy seems to hold true for the 
Netherlands. 
                                                  
5 The variance in external political efficacy from 1971 to 2010, is high. The highest score 
was measured in 1972 and valued 1.90. The lowest score was measured in 2003 and 
valued 1.15. A difference of 0.75 on a four point scale. 
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Figure 6: Level of Negativity and External Political Efficacy in Dutch Parliamentary 
Election campaigns 1971-2010  
 
 
However, what do the striking cases in the data show us? The external political 
efficacy is notably high in 1982 (1.66). In that year, as one can expect from the 
presumption that when the level of negativity is high, the external political efficacy is low, 
the level of negativity is relatively low (32 percent). From 1981 to 1982 the public’s 
external political efficacy increased from 1.47 to 1.66. One expects the level of negativity 
to have decreased during this period, which it did. The level of negativity decreased from 
37 percent in 1981 to 32 percent in 1982. One of the largest increases in external political 
efficacy synchronizes with one of the largest decreases in the level of negativity. 
However, the second large increase of external political efficacy (the one from 1.24 in 
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1998 to 1.41 in 2002) does not correspond with one of the largest decreases in negativity. 
Although negativity relatively decreased much between 1998 and 2002 (from 39 percent 
to 38 percent) it is not the biggest decrease in the level of negativity by far. The largest 
decrease in external political efficacy can be found in the 1972-1977 period. The public’s 
external political efficacy dropped from 1.90 to 1.51, a large drop. One would expect that 
the level of negativity between 1972 and 1977 would have increased significantly. 
However, the level of negativity actually did not (or just very little) increased (from 33.60 
percent to 33.90 percent). The highest level of negativity can be found in 2006 (53 
percent). The external political efficacy in that year is 1.26, which is relatively low but 
definitely not the lowest. The strikingly low level of negativity in 2003 (34 percent) is not 
reflected in the external political efficacy score also. In 2003, the public’s external 
political efficacy was actually the lowest during the time period (1.15). And also the 
largest drop in negativity, which occurred from 2006 to 2010 (respectively 53 and 43 
percent) is not reflected in the public’s external political efficacy. The public’s external 
political efficacy did not increase, as would be expected from the American assumption, 
but even decreases a little (from 1.26 to 1.23).   
That the short term fluctuations within the level of negativity do not relate to the 
short term fluctuations in the public’s external political efficacy also becomes clear from 
a bivariate correlation analysis of the short term changes between the two variables (R is 
not significant).   
Clearly, many other factors will have had an influence on the public’s external 
political efficacy. The fluctuation seems to correspond when looking only at the general 
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trends of the two variables, but when looking closer at specific cases in the data, the 
fluctuation does not correspond at all.  
 
 
8.3.5 Summary and conclusion 
 
The level of negativity seems to influence the four democratic variables (voter turnout, 
political cynicism, and internal and external political efficacy), but it does so on different 
levels. Between internal political efficacy and the level of negativity, almost all 
fluctuations correspond, although it was over a shorter time period. Internal political 
efficacy, as far as the fluctuations over time show, is most likely influenced by a general 
level of negativity. The fluctuation of the level of negativity corresponds with the 
public’s political cynicism but there are exceptions. Other factors also clearly influenced 
the public’s political cynicism. The fluctuation of voter turnout also corresponds with the 
fluctuation of negativity although there are also a lot of short term fluctuations that do not 
resemble. The influence of the level of negativity was limited and other factors clearly 
had an influence on voter turnout. There is very little correspondence between the 
fluctuation of the level of negativity and the public’s external political efficacy. When 
looking at the short term fluctuations, one would expect the level of negativity not to be 
of significant influence on the external political efficacy of the public.  
What can be concluded from this descriptive analysis of fluctuations is that the 
level of negativity might have an influence on some or all of the four depended variables, 
but does not exclusively. Some effects might be attributed to the level of negativity, we 
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cannot reject the US-based hypotheses, but other factors besides the level of negativity in 
a campaign clearly influence voter turnout, political cynicism, and internal and external 
political efficacy. How strong the influence of negativity on the democratic process is and 
what other factors are of influence should be explored in further research.  
 
 
9. Discussion  
 
The aim of this study was to fill the gap in scientific research and to solve the 
contradiction in the small amount of existing scientific research studying the level of 
negativity in political campaigns outside the US, in this case, focusing on a multiparty 
democracy: the Netherlands. It investigates whether negative political campaigning is on 
the rise outside the US, or whether it is just an American phenomenon. 
Three aspects of negative campaigning were examined in this study in which a 
content analysis of campaign related statements made by politicians and political parties 
in the Dutch daily newspaper De Telegraaf from 1971 through 2010 was done. Firstly, 
this study concludes that the level of negativity in political campaigns is on the rise in the 
Netherlands. The popular assumption that the level of negativity in election campaigns is 
also on the rise outside the US context seems according to the findings in this study to be 
correct. The Dutch multi-party system and the culture of mutual respect and consensus 
could not prevent the political climate in the Netherlands from becoming increasingly 
hard and more negative from the 1990’s onwards. Secondly however, the rise of 
negativity in the Netherlands can be nuanced because in most cases the negativity is 
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focused more on relevant content (issues and values) instead of on character traits. There 
is no increase in the focus of negative statements on character traits during time. Thirdly, 
this study has looked at whether the concerns raised by journalist, the public and 
scientists, about the consequences of a increasing level of negative campaigning in 
election campaigns on the democratic process, need to be taken seriously. This study 
concludes that negativity is on the rise, but that the level of negativity does not seem to 
significantly influence the variables which qualify the democratic process. Other factors, 
besides the general level of negativity in a campaign, clearly matter for the democratic 
functioning. This is one of the first studies to look at the effect of a general level of 
negativity in campaigns on the general voter turnout, the public’s political cynicism and 
the public’s internal and external political efficacy outside a US context.  
The results in this study may very well be applicable to other Western European 
countries. The Netherlands namely is an unlikely case for negativity to occur, because the 
Netherlands has a long-standing culture of mutual respect and consensus, and a complex 
political environment of a multiparty system. In Western European countries lacking such 
a complex political environment and culture, negativity might be even more likely to 
occur.  
This study and its results have contributed to the relatively young and small field 
of negative campaigning outside the USA. However, it has its limitations. Firstly this 
study could not make any causal claims regarding the influence of a rising level of 
negativity on the democratic process in the Netherlands. From this study it appears as if 
though negativity can be associated with the four ‘democratic process variables’, but not 
much. Other factors clearly matter.  More thorough research on this matter is necessary to 
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support or reject the claim that a rising level of negativity may harm the democratic 
process, as is often assumed. Following research should incorporate other factors, besides 
a general level of negativity, not incorporated in this thesis that might have an influence 
on general voter turnout, political cynicism, and internal and external political efficacy. 
Those other factors should be controlled for to detect whether and to what extent the level 
of negativity in election campaign influences the political process. 
Secondly this study analyzed statements made by political parties or politicians 
during a campaign which are mentioned or quoted in national newspaper articles 
covering the campaign, to determine the level of negativity in a campaign. Although a 
newspaper-based assessment of tone proves to be a useful proxy measure for campaign 
tone (Ridout & Franz, 2008) unfortunately this study, due to time constraints, could only 
incorporate articles covering the campaigns from one newspaper, De Telegraaf. Although 
it is the Dutch newspaper with the highest circulation, it is also known to focus more on 
entertainment and soft news than on hard political news. Ideally, this study would have 
analyzed multiple newspapers, starting with De Volkskrant, the newspaper which has the 
second highest circulation and the reputation of a more quality newspaper. A reliability 
test between the statements covered in the different newspapers would have been done to 
determine whether different newspapers mirror different levels of campaign negativity. 
Further research on negative campaigning outside the US context seems necessary 
because different studies draw different conclusions. The results of this study validate 
Walter’s (2009) conclusion, who also found increasing levels of negative campaigning in 
the Netherlands from the 2002 election campaign onwards. However, conclusions made 
by Håkansson (1999), Esaiasson & Håkansson (2002), Bjerling (2007), Van Heerde-
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Hudson (2011), and Elemund-Præstekær & Mølgaard Svensson (2011) that negative 
campaigning is not on the rise in Western European countries and that negative 
campaigning is an American phenomenon only, are contradicted by the findings in this 
study. Contextual factors might explain why in certain countries, like the Netherlands, 
negativity seems to be on the rise, but in others countries not. A comparative study which 
investigates and compares negativity across different countries might clarify which 
contextual factors are required in order for negativity to occur and rise.  
The contradictions in different conclusions might also be due to the fact that 
different studies use different methods to measure the level of negativity. Although 
Ridout and Franz (2008) conclude that all methods used to measure negativity used in 
political science are correlated, it seems appropriate to investigate the difference in levels 
of negativity across different communication sources. Walter and Vliegenthart (2010) 
have already begun to do so and also conclude that the level of negative campaigning is 
not reflected differently across different communication channels. However, their study 
was limited to three communication channels (paid publicity as a whole, election debates, 
and newspaper coverage) over the course of one single election (2006). This could be 
researched more thoroughly.   
If the detected trend holds, we can expect that in the next Dutch parliamentary 
election campaign of September 12 2012, parties will go dirtier then in the 2010 
campaign. However the focus of this negativity will likely be predominantly on content, 
rather than on politicians’ or parties’ character traits. Furthermore, this negativity is not 
expected to reach such a high level that it has significant consequences for the 
functioning of the Dutch democratic political system. We do not have to be worried.  
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Note: When I finished writing my thesis, Annemarie Walter presented her dissertation 
about negative campaigning. She has done a comparative study on the level of negativity 
in parliamentary elections between 1981 until 2006 in the UK, Germany and the 
Netherlands. She concludes that there is no rise in the amount of negativity in all three 
Western democracies and that negative campaigning is an American phenomenon only. 
Her conclusion about the level of negativity in the Netherlands contradicts my results. 
She also concludes, in agreement with my results, that the focus on character traits in 
negative campaigning did not increase over time. I could however not encounter her 
results in my thesis because her dissertation was published after I finished my thesis.  
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Appendix 1: Data content analysis  
 
 
In the content analysis of newspaper coverage of the election campaign in De Telegraaf 
from 1971 till 2010, 2986 statements from 1044 articles were coded in total. In general 
that means that each article covering the parliamentary election campaign in De Telegraaf 
contained 2.86 statements made by politicians or political parties.  
 
Table 1:  De Telegraaf 1971-2010 
Election Year  Number of Articles  
covering the campaign in 
De Telegraaf 
Number of Statements made by politicians 
or political parties in the articles covering 
the campaign in De Telegraaf 
1971 85 141 
1972 93 226 
1977 95 227 
1981 91 213 
1982 65 213 
1986 76 256 
1989 72 220 
1994 106 354 
1998 85 320 
2002 58 150 
2003 50 233 
2006 88 187 
2010 80 246 
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Appendix 2: Codebook and coding scheme  
 
 
2.1 Codebook  
 
In this study the unit of analysis is any statement made by a politician or political party 
presented in a newspaper article covering the campaign in De Telegraaf. A statement or 
appeal is an explicit expression or claim from a politician or political party in which is 
brought forward why a voter should vote for a certain party or not.  
 
2.1.1 Tone of statement 
Statements or appeals made by politicians or parties are coded as: 
(1) appeal or statement of politicians or political parties in the article is positive 
(references to a party or candidate praising itself; positive campaigning) 
(2) appeal or statement in the article is negative (references criticizing opposing 
political parties or candidates; negative campaigning) 
(3) appeal or statement in the article is both negative and positive (references of a 
party in which an other party is criticized and in which the own party is praised) 
 
2.1.2 Content of Statement 
Statements or appeals made by politicians or political parties in newspaper articles are 
then coded as: 
(1) is focusing on issue (statements about specific policies like increasing taxes or 
immigration) 
(2) is focusing on value (statements about broad themes such as hope and change) 
(3) is focusing on character trait (statements about the party’s or politicians 
characteristics like experience, intelligence, skills, credibility, consistency, 
honesty, clearness, etc) 
(4) is focusing on something else (focusing on neither issue, value, or character 
trait) 
 
 
 
2.2 Examples of coding 
 
1. An on issue focused negative statement 
‘’"Juist de kwetsbaarste kinderen worden de dupe van een crisis waar zij geen bal aan 
kunnen doen" zegt Cohen "De crisis komt van rechts".‘’ 
(Algemeen Dagblad, 28 februari 2011) 
 
2. An on value focused negative statement 
‘’Op een partijbijeenkomst in Alphen aan den Rijn zei VVD-leider Bolkestein 
gisteravond dat "CDA en PvdA van meet af aan de problemen hebben onderschat, dat 
deden zij in 1989 en dat doen zij nog steeds".‘’ 
(Algemeen Dagblad, 22 april 1994) 
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3. An on character trait focused negative statement 
‘’Maxime Verhagen zei: "Met Bos bent u de klos".‘’ 
(De Volkskrant, 9 september, 2006) 
 
4. An on issue focused positive statement 
‘’ Kok in Eindhoven: "We hebben harde maatregelen genomen, zijn moeilijk beleid niet 
uit de weg gegaan. Maar intussen hebben we een omslagpunt bereikt. Het financiële 
beleid van de afgelopen jaren stelt ons nu in staat de werkgelegenheid bovenaan te 
zetten".‘’ 
(Algemeen Dagblad, 23 april 1994) 
 
5. An on value focused positive statement 
‘’ D66-leider De Graaf heeft gisteren opgeroepen tot verandering.‘’ 
(Telegraaf, 7 maart 2002) 
 
6. An on character trait focused positive statement 
‘’Hans Dijkstal zei: "Ik ben een teamspeler".‘’ 
(Telegraaf, 4 mei 2002). 
 
 
 
2.3. Coding scheme  
 
Year Election 
Campaign 
Newspaper in 
which the article 
that is covering 
the campaign is 
published  
Date of 
article 
covering the 
campaign 
# Article 
covering 
the 
campaign 
# Statement 
in article 
(0 will be 
system 
missing) 
# Statements Tone statement: 
(1) = positive 
(2) = negative 
(3) = mixed 
Content 
statements 
(1) = Issue 
(2) = Value 
(3) = Character 
Trait 
(4) = Else 
1     …. Telegraaf ..-..-…. 1  2 
2   
…. Telegraaf ..-..-…. 2 1 3     
4   
5   
…. Telegraaf  ..-..-…. 3 3 
6   
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Appendix 3: Voter turnout data IDEA 
 
 
The voter turnout in a election year is the percentages of the population who are entitled 
to vote for parliamentary elections, which did actually voted in that election.  
 
Table 2: Voter Turnout in the Netherlands  
Election Year  Voter Turnout  
1971 79.08 
1972 83.50 
1977 88.00 
1981 87.03 
1982 80.98 
1986 85.76 
1989 80.27 
1994 78.75 
1998 73.23 
2002 79.06 
2003 80.04 
2006 80.35 
2010 75.40 
 
This data was derived from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistence (IDEA).   
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=NL 
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Appendix 4: NKO Data 
 
 
4.1 Political Cynicism  
 
The political cynicism score is a variable in the NKO data which is introduced in the 
questionnaire since the election of 1977 and the questionnaire in 1982 lacks this question. 
Three questions were used to calculate the political cynicism score: 
  
(1) Item:    PoliticalCynicism1: Politicians promise more than they can  
    deliver. 
 
Question 1:  Some people say that there is much to criticize in politics, 
others say that it is not so bad. Could you say to what 
extent you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Although they know better, politicians promise more than 
they can deliver. 
 
Sommigen zeggen dat er veel is aan te merken op de 
politiek, anderen zeggen dat het wel meevalt. Kunt u 
zeggen in hoeverre u het met de volgende uitspraken eens 
of oneens bent? 
Tegen beter weten in beloven politici meer dan ze kunnen 
waarmaken. 
 
 
(2)  Item:    PoliticalCynicism2: Ministers primarily self-interested. 
 
Question:  Ministers and state secretaries are primarily concerned 
about their personal interests. 
 
Ministers en staatssecretarissen zijn vooral op hun 
eigenbelang uit. 
 
Note:   Refer to PoliticalCynisism1 for complete question text. 
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(3) Item:    PoliticalCynicism3: Friends more important than abilities  
    to become MP. 
 
Question:  One is more likely to become a member of parliament 
because of one’s political friends than because of one’s 
abilities. 
 
Kamerlid word je eerder door je politieke vrienden dan 
door je bekwaamheden. 
 
Note:   Refer to PoliticalCynisism1 for complete question text. 
 
 
The political cynicism score was established by counting the number of ‘positive’ 
responses to these three questions.  
 
The political cynicisms score can vary from 0 (zero of the above mentioned questions 
was answered positively) to 3 (all were answered positively). 0 indicates a very low level 
of political cynicism and 3 a very high level.  
 
The political cynicism score for 2010 was calculated by using the same three questions 
and the same method of calculation. Firstly the three Political Cynicism variables 
(PolicalCynicism1, PolicalCynicism2, and PolicalCynicism3) were recoded into the same 
variables (values 1,2 → value 1 and values 3,4 →  value 0) and then a new variable was 
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computed: PoliticalCynicismScore = PolitcalCynisism1 + PolitcalCynisism2 + 
PolitcalCynisism3. 
 
The averages of the political cynicism scores were derived for each election year 
separately.  
 
Table 3: Political Cynicism Score  
Election 
Year 
Political 
Cynicism 
Score  
1971 -  
1972 -  
1977 1.43 
1981 1.39 
1982 -  
1986 1.55 
1989 1.51 
1994 1.60 
1998 1.52 
2002 1.68 
2003 1.54 
2006 1.71 
2010 1.73 
 
 
4.2 External Political Efficacy 
 
In the Merged NKO dataset 1971-2006 five questions were used to calculate the external 
political efficacy score. However one question was left out the 2010 dataset 
(ExternalPoliticalEfficacy4: SO many people vote, my vote does not matter) and one 
question has been asked since 1998 (ExternalPoliticalEfficacy5: MPs quickly lose contact 
with citizens).  These two variables are left out of the analysis and a new four point scale 
was created for the external political efficacy, which now is created by the following 
three variables.  
 
(1)  Item:    ExternalPoliticalEfficacy1: MPs do (not) care about    
    opinions of people like me. 
 
Question:  I shall now read you a number of statements. Would you 
tell me for each statement if, according to you, it is true or 
false? 
Members of parliament do not care about the opinions of 
people like me. 
  
Ik lees u nu enkele uitspraken voor. Wilt u voor elke 
uitspraak zeggen of dit volgens u zo is of niet zo is? 
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Kamerleden bekommeren zich niet om de mening van 
mensen zoals ik. 
 
 
(2) Item:   ExternalPoliticalEfficacy2: Parties only interested in my  
    vote, not in my opinion. 
 
Question:  Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in 
my opinions. 
 
De politieke partijen zijn alleen maar geïnteresseerd in mijn 
stem en niet in mijn mening. 
 
Note:  Refer to ExternalPoliticalEfficacy1 for complete question 
text. 
 
 
(3) Item:    ExternalPoliticalEfficacy3: People like me have no  
    influence on politics. 
 
Question: People like me have absolutely no influence on 
governmental policy. 
 
Mensen zoals ik hebben geen enkele invloed op de 
regeringspolitiek. 
 
Note: Refer to ExternalPoliticalEfficacy1 for complete question 
text. 
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The external political efficacy score was established by counting the number of ‘positive’ 
responses to these three questions.  
 
The external political efficacy score can vary from 0 (zero of the above mentioned 
questions was answered positively) to 3 (all were answered positively). 0 indicates a very 
low level of external political efficacy and 3 a very high level.  
 
The score was calculated: firstly the three Political Cynicism variables (PolicalCynicism1, 
PolicalCynicism2, and PolicalCynicism3) were recoded into the same variables (values 1 
→ value 1 and values 2 →  value 0) and then a new variable was computed: 
ExternalPoliticalEfficacyScore = ExternalPoliticalEfficacy1 + ExternalPoliticalEfficacy2 
+ ExternalPoliticalEfficacy3. 
 
The averages of the external political efficacy scores were derived for each election year 
separately.  
 
Table 4: External Political Efficacy Score  
Election 
Year 
External 
Political 
Efficacy Score  
1971 1.87 
1972 1.90 
1977 1.51 
1981 1.47 
1982 1.66 
1986 1.39 
1989 1.29 
1994 1.33 
1998 1.24 
2002 1.41 
2003 1.15 
2006 1.26 
2010 1.23 
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4.3 Internal Political Efficacy 
 
The internal political efficacy score is a variable in the NKO data which is introduced in 
the questionnaire since the election of 1994.  
Three questions were used to calculate he internal political efficacy score. 
 
(1)   Item:    InternalEfficacy1: Consider myself qualified for politics. 
 
Question: Would you tell me whether you fully agree, agree, disagree 
or fully disagree with the following statements. 
I am well qualified to play an active role in politics. 
 
Wilt u van deze uitspraken aangeven of u het daar helemaal 
mee eens; mee eens; mee oneens; of helemaal mee oneens 
bent: 
Ik vind mezelf heel goed in staat om een actieve rol te 
spelen in de politiek. 
 
 
(2)  Item:    InternalEfficacy2: Good understanding of political  
    problems.  
 
Question:  I have a good understanding of the important political 
problems in our country. 
 
Ik heb een goed beeld van de belangrijkste politieke 
problemen in ons land. 
 
Note: Refer to InternalPoliticalEfficacy1 for complete question 
text. 
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(3)  Item:   InternalEfficacy3: Politics sometimes too complicated. 
 
Question:  Sometimes politics seems so complicated that people like 
me cannot really understand what is going on. 
 
Soms lijkt de politiek zo ingewikkeld dat mensen zoals ik 
niet echt kunnen begrijpen wat er speelt. 
 
Note: Refer to InternalPoliticalEfficacy1 for complete question 
text. 
 
 
The internal political efficacy score was established by counting the three ‘positive’ 
responses to these three questions.  
 
The internal efficacy score can vary from 0 (zero of the above mentioned questions was 
answered positively) to 3 (all were answered positively). 0 indicates a very low level of 
internal efficacy and 3 a very high level.  
 
The internal efficacy score for 2010 was calculated by using the same three questions and 
the same method of calculation. Firstly the three internal efficacy variables 
(InternalEfficacy1, InternalEfficacy2, and InternalEfficacy3) were recoded into the same 
variables (values 1,2 → value 1 and values 3,4 →  value 0) and then a new variable was 
computed: InternalEfficacyScore = InteralEfficacy1 + InternalEfficacy2 + 
InternalEfficacy3.  
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The averages of the internal efficacy scores were derived for each election year 
separately.  
 
Table 5: Internal Political efficacy Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Election 
Year 
Internal 
Political 
Efficacy Score  
1971 -  
1972 -  
1977 - 
1981 - 
1982 -  
1986 - 
1989 - 
1994 1.12 
1998 1.26 
2002 1.45 
2003 1.55 
2006 1.20 
2010 1.51 
